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THE LAW COURT’S UNFINISHED ANALYSIS IN 
STATE V. ALI:  APPLYING PADILLA IN MAINE TO 
REMOVE PROCEDURAL BARRIERS TO NON-
CITIZENS’ INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL CLAIMS  
Hannah McMullen* 
INTRODUCTION 
The outcome in State v. Ali1 exemplifies the procedural barriers that prevent a 
non-citizen of the United States from raising an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim while subject to deportation as a result of a criminal conviction pursuant to 
the Immigration and Nationality Act.2  Fahad Ali, a non-citizen of the United States 
residing in Maine, pleaded guilty to and was convicted of aggravated trafficking of 
marijuana3 and was subsequently subject to deportation as a result of that 
conviction.4  Ali filed a motion for a new trial claiming that he did not receive 
effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment, when his attorney 
failed to advise him of the immigration consequences of his criminal conviction.5  
Ali relied on the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Padilla v. 
Kentucky,6 which held that defense counsel has a duty to inform the client of 
deportation consequences of a guilty plea.7  However, the Superior Court denied 
Ali’s motion and concluded that Padilla, which was decided after Ali’s conviction, 
did not apply retroactively.8  Additionally, the court held that Ali was informed of 
the deportation consequences when he entered his guilty plea.9   
On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, 
avoided the Padilla question and instead affirmed the denial of the motion on a 
procedural basis.10  The Law Court held that Ali improperly filed a motion for a 
new trial when the appropriate route to challenge the conviction was to bring a 
claim for post-conviction review, the “exclusive method of review” for claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel.11  As Justice Silver explained in the dissent, 
however, Ali would most likely be precluded from seeking post-conviction review 
                                                                                                     
 * J.D. Candidate 2013, University of Maine School of Law.  I would like to thank Professor 
Deidre Smith for her valuable input on this Note.  
 1. 2011 ME 122, 32 A.3d 1019.  
 2. 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2006).  
 3. State v. Ali, 2011 ME 122, ¶¶ 3-4, 32 A.3d 1019. 
 4. Id. ¶ 7.   
 5. Id. ¶ 8.  
 6. 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).  
 7. Ali, 2011 ME 122, ¶ 9, 32 A.3d 1019.  
 8. Id.  
 9. Id.  
 10. Id. ¶ 17.  
 11. Id. ¶ 20.  
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based on the court’s prior decision in Ngo v. State,12 which held that a non-citizen 
awaiting deportation was not “restrained” under the post-conviction review 
statute.13  As a result, Ali would be left without an opportunity for judicial review.14  
Furthermore, the dissent concluded that the court should address the application of 
Padilla in Maine, particularly its effect on the Ngo decision and also whether it 
applies retroactively.15  
This Note analyzes the question that the Ali majority avoided answering – how 
Padilla should be applied in Maine, especially considering the Law Court’s past 
reluctance to decide this constitutional issue raised by non-citizens such as Ali.  
This Note begins in Part II with a brief overview of the federal Immigration and 
Nationality Act and how a non-citizen may raise a Sixth Amendment claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel through the post-conviction review process in 
Maine.  In Part III, this Note next examines the contrasting opinions of the majority 
and dissent in the Ali decision and specifically how the court’s decision and 
precedent will pose a challenge for Ali seeking post-conviction review in the 
future.  Finally, in Part IV, this Note analyzes the imminent question that the Law 
Court will likely be required to decide in the future of how Padilla should be 
applied in Maine.  
I.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A.  The Immigration and Nationality Act 
Under the federal Immigration and Nationality Act,16 non-citizens of the 
United States who are convicted of certain crimes may be subject to deportation.17  
Deportable offenses include crimes of moral turpitude, aggravated felonies, and 
controlled substance offenses, among others.18  The strict terms of the statute are 
undeniably significant for non-citizens who “may be deported from the country, 
barred from returning, and denied the opportunity to become United States 
citizens” as a result of a criminal conviction.19  However, some non-citizen 
defendants claim that they were unaware of these deportation consequences prior to 
entering a guilty plea for a criminal conviction and therefore, they did not receive 
effective assistance of counsel. This leads to a remaining question of whether non-
citizens have a right to be informed of these consequences at the time of a criminal 
conviction.  
                                                                                                     
 12. 2008 ME 71, 946 A.2d 424.  
 13. Ali, 2011 ME 122, ¶ 25, 32 A.3d 1019.  
 14. Id. ¶ 27.  
 15. Id. ¶¶ 26-28.  
 16. 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2006).  
 17. Id.  
 18. Id. § 1227(a)(2). 
 19. Gray Proctor & Nancy King, Post Padilla: Padilla’s Puzzles for Review in State and Federal 
Courts, 23 FED. SENT’G. REP. 239, 239 (2011).  
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B.  Non-Citizens and Their Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel 
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution states, “[i]n all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance 
of Counsel for his defence.”20  The United States Supreme Court has described the 
right to assistance of counsel as “fundamental” and one that is uniformly applicable 
in state courts under the Fourteenth Amendment.21  The Court has also explained 
that the right to assistance of counsel means the right to “effective” assistance of 
counsel,22 a standard that is analyzed under a two-part test as adopted in Strickland 
v. Washington.23  The Court emphasized that “the purpose of the effective 
assistance guarantee of the Sixth Amendment . . . is simply to ensure that criminal 
defendants receive a fair trial,”24 and therefore, “[t]he benchmark for judging any 
claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the 
proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as 
having produced a just result.”25  In Strickland, the Court held that a defendant 
must show “two components” in support of a claim for ineffective assistance of 
counsel: “First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient. 
. . . Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the 
defense.”26 For the first component of deficiency, the Court applied a 
reasonableness standard that looks at “whether counsel’s assistance was reasonable 
considering all the circumstances.”27  For the second component of prejudice, the 
Court adopted a reasonable probability standard that requires the defendant to 
establish that “but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different.”28  The Court subsequently held that the Strickland test 
applies to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel for guilty pleas as well as for 
trials.29   
While courts in Maine apply a “virtually identical”30 two-part test when 
analyzing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim,31 the claim may only be 
brought through the post-conviction review process pursuant to 15 M.R.S. § 
                                                                                                     
 20. U.S. CONST. amend.VI.  
 21. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963).  
 22. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970).  
 23. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  
 24. Id. at 689.  
 25. Id. at 686.  
 26. Id. at 687.  
 27. Id. at 688.  
 28. Id. at 694.  
 29. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985).  
 30. Laferriere v. State, 1997 ME 169, ¶ 6, 697 A.2d 1301 (quoting Kimball v. State, 490 A.2d 653, 
656 (Me. 1985)). 
 31. Id. (quoting Lagasse v. State, 655 A.2d 328, 329 (Me. 1995)) (“On post conviction review, we 
have consistently applied a two-part test to the conduct of trial counsel to determine if a new trial is 
warranted. The inquiry is: ‘(1) whether counsel’s performance falls measurably below the performance 
that might be expected of an ordinary, fallible attorney; and, if so, (2) whether counsel’s substandard 
performance likely deprived the defendant of an otherwise available substantial ground of defense.’”).  
2012] STATE V. ALI 363 
 
2122.32  As the Law Court has explained, “[w]hen the legality of a criminal 
conviction cannot be resolved by direct appeal or any ‘remedies that are incidental 
to proceedings in the trial court,’ the post-conviction review process is the 
exclusive means for judicial review.”33  A defendant seeking post-conviction 
review must first file a petition in Superior Court demonstrating “that the 
challenged criminal judgment or post-sentencing proceeding is causing a present 
restraint or other specified impediment . . . .”34  The statute further defines “present 
restraint or impediment” to include both direct and indirect results of the 
challenged criminal judgment such as current or pending incarceration, probation, 
parole, conditional release, unconditional discharge, and an imposed fine.35  
There are some cases, however, that do not clearly fit within these explicit 
definitions of a “present restraint or impediment.”  The Law Court has recently 
addressed a series of such cases involving claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel by non-citizens facing deportation as a result of their criminal convictions.  
The court decided these cases primarily on procedural issues, emphasizing that 
post-conviction review in Superior Court is the exclusive remedy available for 
these criminal defendants.  Additionally, the court narrowly interpreted what 
circumstances satisfy the requirement of “present restraint or impediment” under 
the statute, which creates a significant challenge to non-citizens who are subject to 
deportation and seek judicial review.    
For example, in Aldus v. State,36 the Law Court affirmed the Superior Court’s 
decision to grant post-conviction relief and vacate the defendant’s conviction on 
the grounds that the defendant did not receive effective assistance of counsel.37  In 
1998, Aldus, who was a native of Somalia, pleaded guilty to aggravated assault.38  
Before she entered her plea, however, she received a message that the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service was looking for her, and when she asked her counsel 
what this meant, he replied, “I have no idea.”39  Aldus did not ask any other 
questions and her counsel did not request a continuance to follow up on the 
immigration issue, even though he knew she was a non-citizen.40  The Superior 
Court later granted Aldus’ petition for post-conviction review and vacated her 
                                                                                                     
 32. 15 M.R.S.A. § 2122 (2003) (The post conviction review statute provides that “except for direct 
appeals from a criminal judgment, [post-conviction review is] the exclusive method of review of those 
criminal judgments and of post-sentencing proceedings occurring during the course of sentences. It is a 
remedy for illegal restraint and other impediments specified in section 2124 that have occurred directly 
or indirectly as a result of an illegal criminal judgment or post-sentencing proceeding. It replaces the 
remedies available pursuant to post-conviction habeas corpus . . .”). 
 33. State v. Ngo, 2007 ME 2, ¶ 4, 912 A.2d 1224. 
 34. 15 M.R.S.A. § 2124 (2003).  
 35. Id.  
 36. 2000 ME 47, 748 A.2d 463.  
 37. Id. ¶ 1.  This was one of the Law Court’s earlier decisions involving a non-citizen’s ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim. Unlike the subsequent series of cases that were decided on procedural 
issues, however, in this case, the court affirmed the lower court’s decision on the merits of the 
defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.    
 38. Id. ¶ 2.  
 39. Id. ¶ 6.  
 40. Id.  
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conviction on the grounds that she did not receive effective assistance of counsel 
when her counsel failed to investigate her question about immigration services.41  
The court concluded that her counsel should have been “alerted” to a possible 
immigration problem as a result of the question, especially considering his 
knowledge about her citizenship status.42  Furthermore, his “inability to answer her 
question”43 and failure to investigate the issue amounted to a “performance 
measurably below what ‘might be expected from an ordinary fallible attorney’”44 
and thus satisfied the first part of the test for an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim.45  The court explained “the ordinary fallible attorney is expected to advise a 
defendant, when that client has a question about a serious consequence of a plea 
agreement, that the plea need not be entered that day.”46   
On the contrary, in State v. Trott,47 the Law Court upheld the District Court’s 
denial of a motion to vacate a conviction on the grounds that the defendant could 
pursue post-conviction review in Superior Court.48  In 2001, Trott, who was a 
citizen of Bermuda, pleaded no contest and was convicted of terrorizing his wife 
and obstructing the report of a crime.49  He was sentenced to sixty days with credit 
for time served, allowing him to be immediately released because he had already 
been incarcerated for more than the sixty days from the time he was initially 
charged.50  Later in 2003, he was subject to deportation based on his criminal 
convictions, which were considered crimes of domestic violence, a deportable 
offense under 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (a)(2)(E)(i).51  Trott then filed a motion to vacate his 
convictions, arguing he had no other available remedy and alleging ineffective 
assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to advise him of immigration 
consequences of his criminal conviction.52  The District Court denied his motion, 
however, finding that he did have an available remedy through post-conviction 
review in Superior Court.53  The Law Court affirmed, concluding that his sentence 
to time previously served was the “functional equivalent of an unconditional 
discharge as that term is addressed by the post-conviction review statute” and 
therefore, “[s]uch a time served is a present restraint by criminal judgment pursuant 
                                                                                                     
 41. Id. ¶ 11.  Additionally, “[t]he Superior Court noted that the conviction for aggravated assault 
meant that Aldus was ‘conclusively presumed’ to be deportable.” Id.  
 42. Id. ¶ 17.  
 43. Id. ¶ 11.  
 44. Id. ¶ 12.  
 45. Id. ¶ 16.  
 46. Id. ¶ 18.  The court further concluded that the second component of prejudice was satisfied as 
well because Aldus’ testimony at the post-conviction hearing “raise[d] a fair inference that if [counsel] 
had told Aldus that they could defer entering a plea on the aggravated assault charge to find out why 
INS was looking for her, Aldus would not have entered a plea of guilty.” Id. ¶ 21. 
 47. 2004 ME 15, 841 A.2d 789.  
 48. Id. ¶ 1.  
 49. Id. ¶¶ 2-3.  He was also initially charged with assaulting his wife but that charge was later 
dismissed.  Id. ¶ 3.  
 50. Id. ¶ 3. 
 51. Id. ¶ 4.  
 52. Id. ¶¶ 5-6.  
 53. Id. ¶ 7.  
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to section 2124 (1)(C).”54  
Similarly in State v. Ngo (hereinafter “Ngo I”),55 the Law Court again affirmed 
the District Court’s denial of a motion to vacate a conviction on the grounds that 
post-conviction review was the exclusive remedy available for the defendant.56  
Ngo was a citizen of Vietnam who had been residing in the United States for about 
six years when, in 1998, he pleaded guilty to and was convicted of sexual abuse of 
a minor and criminal threatening.57  In 2006, years after he finished serving his 
sentence, he was detained by federal immigration officials and subject to 
deportation as a result of his prior criminal convictions.58  While detained, Ngo 
filed a motion to vacate his criminal convictions, alleging that he did not receive 
effective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to advise him of the 
immigration consequences of his guilty plea.59  Ngo brought his motion under 
Maine Rule of Criminal Procedure 1(c) which states, “[w]hen no procedure is 
specifically prescribed the court shall proceed in any lawful manner not 
inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States or of the State of Maine, 
these rules or any applicable statutes.”60  The District Court, however, dismissed 
his Rule 1(c) motion on the grounds that the “Superior Court holds exclusive 
jurisdiction over post-conviction review . . . .”61  The Law Court affirmed, finding 
that Ngo improperly filed a Rule 1(c) motion without first pursuing post-conviction 
review in the Superior Court.62  The court reasoned that “Ngo’s motion under Rule 
1(c), which seeks the relief that the post-conviction review process is intended to 
provide, cannot circumvent that process or defeat the procedural requirement that 
post-conviction review take place in the Superior Court.”63 
Ngo subsequently petitioned for post-conviction review in Superior Court but 
the court dismissed his petition on the grounds that he “failed to demonstrate that 
the criminal judgment he sought to challenge was causing him a present restraint or 
impediment within the meaning of 15 M.R.S. § 2124(1).” 64  On appeal, the Law 
Court affirmed the Superior Court’s dismissal in Ngo v. State (hereinafter “Ngo II”) 
concluding that “a non-citizen who is being restrained in the course of deportation 
proceedings that were instituted because of the non-citizen’s prior convictions is 
not undergoing a present restraint within the meaning of [the post-conviction 
review statute].”65  
Although the holding in Ngo II practically precludes non-citizens subject to 
deportation from seeking post-conviction review, it may be subject to further 
                                                                                                     
 54. Id. ¶ 13.  
 55. 2007 ME 2, 912 A.2d 1224.  
 56. Id. ¶ 4.  
 57. Id. ¶ 2.  
 58. Id.  
 59. Id. ¶ 3.  
 60. ME. R. CRIM. P. 1(c).  
 61. State v. Ngo, 2007 ME 2, ¶ 3, 912 A. 2d 1224.  
 62. Id. ¶¶ 1, 5.  
 63. Id. ¶ 6.  
 64. Ngo v. State, 2008 ME 71, ¶ 5, 946 A.2d 424.  
 65. Id. ¶ 9 n. 3 (citing State v. Trott, 2004 ME 15, ¶ 9, 841 A.2d 789).  
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review in light of the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Padilla v. 
Kentucky.66  In Padilla, Jose Padilla, who was a citizen of Honduras but had been a 
“lawful permanent resident of the United States for more than forty years,” pleaded 
guilty to transporting a large amount of marijuana and later was subject to 
deportation as a result of the criminal conviction.67  Padilla sought post-conviction 
review alleging that his defense counsel failed to advise him of the immigration 
consequences of his plea and also gave him incorrect advice about his 
circumstances by saying Padilla “did not have to worry about immigration status 
since he had been in the country so long.”68  The Supreme Court of Kentucky 
denied his post-conviction review on the grounds that counsel’s advice about 
deportation, although incorrect advice, did not constitute ineffective assistance of 
counsel because deportation was only a “collateral” consequence of the criminal 
conviction.69  However, the United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that 
defense counsel has a duty to advise the client of immigration consequences.70  The 
Court explained that “advice regarding deportation is not categorically removed 
from the ambit of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Strickland applies to 
Padilla’s claim.”71  The Court did not distinguish between direct and collateral 
consequences but rather concluded that “[d]eportation as a consequence of a 
criminal conviction is, because of its close connection to the criminal process, 
uniquely difficult to classify as either a direct or a collateral consequence.”72  
Furthermore, the Court described deportation as “enmeshed” and “intimately 
related to the criminal process.”73  The Court also held: 
When the law is not succinct and straightforward . . . a criminal defense attorney 
need do no more than advise a noncitizen client that pending criminal charges may 
carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences. But when the deportation 
consequence is truly clear, as it was in this case, the duty to give correct advice is 
equally clear.74 
The Court explained that Padilla’s risk of deportation for a controlled 
substance offense should have been easily ascertained just by reading the statute 
and therefore, his counsel was deficient in his failure to advise Padilla of the 
deportation consequences.75  
Padilla was a landmark decision which set forth new principles for 
immigration and criminal law because of the explicit duty its holding imposed on 
defense counsel.  However, the decision left many unanswered questions, 
particularly whether it applies retroactively.  Because many defendants will likely 
                                                                                                     
 66. 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).  
 67. Id. at 1477.  
 68. Id. at 1478. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 1482.  
 71. Id.   
 72. Id.  
 73. Id. at 1481.  
 74. Id. at 1483.  
 75. Id.  
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raise their Padilla claims on collateral or post-conviction review, the question is 
whether the Padilla holding applies to convictions that occurred prior to Padilla.76  
The answer to that question depends on whether the Padilla holding constitutes a 
new constitutional rule.  In Teague v. Lane,77 the Supreme Court held that “new 
constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases [on 
collateral review]78 which have become final before the new rules are 
announced.”79  The Court explained that a new rule is one that “breaks new ground 
or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government.”80  
Furthermore, “a case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by 
precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final.”81  
II.  THE ALI DECISION 
A.  Factual Background 
In April 2008, eighteen-year-old Fahad Ali was arrested in Portland, Maine for 
possessing seven small bags of marijuana which he was allegedly trying to sell for 
ten dollars each.82  “Ali was charged with aggravated trafficking in scheduled 
drugs” under 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1105-A(1)(E)(6).83  Ali was appointed counsel and 
initially pleaded not guilty at his arraignment but later changed his plea to guilty.84  
At the next hearing on October 10, 2008,85 before accepting Ali’s plea, the court 
inquired about Ali’s citizenship status,86  and Ali stated that he was born in Somalia 
                                                                                                     
 76. See Proctor & King, supra note 19.  
 77. 489 U.S. 288 (1989). 
 78. The Court distinguished between cases on direct and collateral review, specifically that new 
constitutional rules are not applicable to cases on collateral review, such as the traditional writ of habeas 
corpus.  The Court explained that, “[a]pplication of constitutional rules not in existence at the time a 
conviction became final seriously undermines the principle of finality which is essential to the operation 
of our criminal justice system.” Id. at 309. 
 79. Id. at 310.  The Court identified two general exceptions to the retroactivity rule: 
First, a new rule should be applied retroactively if it places ‘certain kinds of primary, 
private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to 
proscribe.” Second, a new rule should be applied retroactively if it requires the 
observance of “those procedures that . . . are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”  
Id. at 307 (citations omitted).  
 80. Id. at 301.  
 81. Id. 
 82. State v. Ali, 2011 ME 122 ¶ 3, 32 A.3d 1019.  
 83. Id.  Ali was arrested near Portland High School. The statute 17-A M.R.S. §1105-A(1)(E)(6) 
provides, “A person is guilty of aggravated trafficking in  a scheduled drug if  . . . [a]t the time of the 
offense, the person is on a school bus or within 1,000 feet of the real property comprising a private or 
public elementary or secondary school or a safe zone . . . and the drug is . . . [a] schedule Z drug. 
Violation of this subparagraph is a Class C crime.” 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1105-A(1)(E)(6) (2011).  
 84. Ali, 2011 ME 122, ¶ 4, 32 A.3d 1019.  
 85. Brief for Appellee at 5, State v. Ali, 2011 ME 122, 32 A.3d 1019 (No. CUM-11-141).  
 86. When a defendant enters a plea under Rule 11 of the Maine Rules of Criminal Procedure, the 
court must first address the defendant to ensure that the defendant is making the plea knowingly and 
voluntarily. ME R. CRIM. P. 11. 
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and was not a citizen of the United States.87  Ali’s attorney stated that Ali and his 
mother were “working with the immigration project.”88  The attorney stated that he 
explained to Ali that there were possible immigration consequences as a result of 
the conviction.89  The court asked Ali a series of questions to determine if he 
understood the possible immigration consequences of his conviction and Ali 
responded in the affirmative.90  Ali still agreed to plead guilty and he was 
sentenced to four months imprisonment and ordered to pay a $400 fine.91  Ali paid 
his fine and completed his sentence by September 14, 2010.92  
B.  Procedural History 
On February 10, 2011,93 several months after completing his sentence, Ali 
received notice of his immigration status from the United States Department of 
Homeland Security indicating that he was subject to deportation under the 
Immigration and Nationality Act as a result of his conviction for aggravated 
trafficking in scheduled drugs.94  On March 9, 2011,95 Ali, while detained and 
awaiting removal, filed a motion for a new trial in which he claimed that he did not 
receive effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment because he was 
not “adequately” informed about the immigration consequences of his conviction 
prior to entering his plea.96  Ali cited Maine Rules of Criminal Procedure 1(c),97 
                                                                                                     
 87. Ali, 2011 ME 122, ¶ 4, 32 A.3d 1019.  
 88. Id. ¶ 4.  
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. ¶ 5. 
Court: You understand that a conviction here of this charge may in fact result in you 
being deportable from this country? 
Ali: Yes, Your Honor. 
Court: Do you understand that? 
Ali: Yes, Your Honor. 
Court: And you have talked about this with your attorney here? 
Ali: Yes, Your Honor. 
Court: And you and your mother are also working with the immigration project in regard 
to this issue? 
Ali: Yes, Your Honor.  
Court: You understand there can be no promises or guarantees that you will be permitted 
to stay in this country if you in fact are convicted of this charge? 
Ali: Yes, Your Honor. 
Court: Do you still want to go ahead with your plea? 
Ali: Yes, Your Honor. 
Id. 
 91. Id. ¶ 6. (Ali’s four month sentence was served at Long Creek Youth Development Center 
concurrently with another sentence he had for a separate juvenile offense). Id.   
 92. Id. 
 93. Brief for Appellant at 5, State v. Ali, 2011 ME 122, 32 A.3d 1019 (No. CUM-11-141); Brief for 
Appellee , supra note 85, at 6.  
 94. Ali, 2011 ME 122, ¶ 7, 32 A.3d 1019.  
 95. Brief for Appellee , supra note 85, at 4.  
 96. Ali, 2011 ME 122, ¶ 8, 32 A.3d 1019.  
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2,98 and 3399 in support of his motion.100  Ali argued that his “imminent removal 
and the lack of available relief” was new evidence under Rule 33 and thus grounds 
for a new trial “in the interest of justice, due process and effective assistance of 
counsel.”101 At a non-testimonial hearing, the Superior Court denied Ali’s motion 
for a new trial on the grounds that the Supreme Court’s holding in Padilla did not 
apply retroactively and also that Ali was “sufficiently aware of the immigration 
consequences of his plea at the time he entered it.”102  Ali subsequently appealed to 
the Law Court.103 
C.  Arguments 
On appeal, Ali primarily relied on the Supreme Court’s holding in Padilla and 
argued that he did not receive effective assistance of counsel because his counsel 
failed to advise him of the “presumptively deportable nature of the conviction, and 
the automatic removal that would thereafter take place . . . .”104  In support of his 
claim, Ali asserted that his case fell squarely within the Padilla holding in that the 
immigration consequences related to his conviction were explicit in the statute and 
his counsel failed to advise him of the consequences prior to his decision to enter a 
guilty plea.105  Specifically, Ali’s offenses qualified as both an aggravated felony 
and controlled substance offense under the statute.106  Ali further argued that the 
court’s Rule 11 inquiry as to his understanding of possible deportation 
                                                                                                     
 97. ME. R. CRIM. P. 1(c) provides, “Procedure When None Specified. When no procedure is 
specifically prescribed the court shall proceed in any lawful manner not inconsistent with the 
Constitution of the United States or of the State of Maine, these rules or any applicable statutes.” 
 98. ME. R. CRIM. P. 2 provides, “[t]hese rules are intended to provide for the just determination of 
every criminal proceeding. They shall be construed to secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in 
administration and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay.” 
 99. ME. R. CRIM. P. 33 provides in relevant part,  
The court on motion of the defendant may grant a new trial to the defendant if required in 
the interest of justice. If the trial was by the court without a jury the court on motion of a 
defendant for a new trial may vacate the judgment if entered, take additional testimony 
and direct entry of a new judgment. A motion for a new trial based on any ground other 
than newly discovered evidence shall be made within 10 days after verdict or finding of 
guilty or within such further time as the court may fix during the 10-day period. Any 
motion for a new trial based on the ground of newly discovered evidence may be made 
only before, or within 2 years after, entry of the judgment in the criminal docket.  
 100. Ali, 2011 ME 122, ¶ 8, 32 A.3d 1019.  
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consequences was “not sufficient to overcome the ineffective assistance.”107  
Ali also claimed that post-conviction review was not an available remedy for 
his situation, similar to Ngo, and without the option of post-conviction review, he 
was “without remedy.”108  In addition, Ali stressed the interrelation between 
immigration consequences and criminal convictions, emphasizing the Court’s 
reasoning in Padilla that “advice regarding deportation is not categorically 
removed from the ambit of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.”109  In turn, Ali 
inferred that Padilla suggests other relief beyond post-conviction review must be 
made available for defendants in his situation.110   Moreover, Ali asserted that 
Padilla applies retroactively because it is not a new rule.111  In accord with his 
argument that post-conviction review is not available, Ali argued:   
Applying the newly discovered evidence standard of Rule 33 to the simplicity and 
fairness dictates of Rule 2, and proceeding in a manner consistent with 
constitutional due process under Rule 1, the court should find the Defendant’s 
motion for a new trial is the appropriate means to the appropriate relief.112 
In contrast, the State argued that Ali’s motion was properly denied because 
post-conviction review is the “exclusive means” for review of claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel as outlined by the Law Court’s prior decision in Ngo I.113  
The State acknowledged that Padilla may be relevant to the holding in Ngo II  but 
emphasized that “the holding in Padilla has no relevancy to the holding of Ngo I 
because Ngo I merely holds that post-conviction review was the exclusive means 
for judicial review . . . .”114  Nevertheless, the State asserted that even if the Padilla 
holding was relevant in this case, it would not be applicable because it does not 
apply retroactively.115  In support of this argument, the State asserted that Padilla 
constituted a new rule under Teague because it was not “dictated by then-existing 
precedent.”116  The State reasoned that there was a clear disparity between Padilla, 
which imposes a duty on criminal defense counsel to advise a client of deportation 
consequences, and the Law Court’s prior decision in Ngo II, which concluded that 
“deportation is a civil sanction and not imposed as punishment for a crime . . . .”117  
D.  Decision of the Law Court 
The majority affirmed the lower court’s denial of Ali’s motion based on 
procedural grounds.118  The majority held that Ali improperly brought his claim of 
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ineffective assistance of counsel by way of a motion for a new trial when the 
appropriate and exclusive remedy was to bring his claim through post-conviction 
review.119  Comparing the case to Ngo I, the court reasoned “[w]e do not consider 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal; such claims will only 
be considered after a certificate of probable cause has been issued following a 
hearing on a post-conviction petition.”120  The court concluded that Rule 1(c) was 
inapplicable, as it was in Ngo I, because post-conviction review is the prescribed 
procedure for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.121  Likewise, the court 
explained that Rule 2 does not “provide for the application of an inappropriate 
procedure where an appropriate procedure already exists.”122  Additionally, the 
court found that although Ali claimed his risk of deportation was newly discovered 
evidence as grounds for a new trial under Rule 33, his motion for a new trial 
exceeded the two-year deadline.123  Furthermore, even though Ali argued that the 
Padilla holding was applicable to his case, the majority declined to address 
Padilla’s application and whether or not it would cause them to “reconsider” their 
prior holding in Ngo II.124  
Justice Silver dissented on the grounds that the court should have addressed 
whether or not the Padilla holding would be applicable to Ali.125  He explained 
that, although the court previously avoided addressing this constitutional issue in 
Ngo II and Trott, “the post-conviction rights of noncitizen defendants is a quickly-
evolving and topical area of law that deserves the Court’s attention sooner rather 
than later.”126  Justice Silver concluded that, based on Ngo II, post-conviction 
review would likely be unavailable to Ali because Ali was not “restrained” as 
required in the post-conviction statute.127  Justice Silver explained that this would 
leave Ali “without any legal recourse”128 and therefore, Rule 1(c) should be 
applicable to Ali if post-conviction review is unavailable.129  However, Justice 
Silver further noted the apparent disparity between the court’s reasoning in Ngo II 
that “deportation is a civil, collateral consequence of conviction” and the Supreme 
Court’s reasoning in Padilla that “deportation is an integral part—indeed, 
sometimes the most important part—of the penalty that may be imposed on 
noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes . . . .”130  He concluded 
that the court may have to re-examine its reasoning in Ngo II in light of Padilla:131 
“[t]o the extent that Padilla treats deportation as a penalty arising from a criminal 
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judgment, it suggests that noncitizen petitioners subject to this penalty are entitled 
to review pursuant to section 2124.”132  Moreover, Justice Silver also concluded 
that Padilla should apply retroactively and post-conviction review should be made 
available to Ali.133  
III.  ANALYSIS 
The Law Court’s decision in Ali is just one example of the procedural barriers 
preventing a non-citizen from raising a constitutional claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel while awaiting deportation as a result of a criminal 
conviction.  Although the majority held that Ali’s exclusive remedy for raising his 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is through post-conviction review, Ngo II 
likely precludes Ali from seeking post-conviction review based on the court’s 
holding that deportation is not a “present restraint”134 under the post-conviction 
review statute.  As Justice Silver concluded in his dissent, however, the court’s 
holding in Ngo II is irreconcilable with the Supreme Court’s holding in Padilla.  In 
Padilla, the Court held that defense counsel has an obligation, under the Sixth 
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, to advise a client of 
immigration consequences that result from a criminal conviction.  Additionally, the 
Court concluded that immigration consequences, particularly deportation, are 
“intimately related” and “enmeshed” with criminal convictions.135  Accordingly, 
deportation as a consequence of a criminal conviction is part of the criminal 
penalty and a non-citizen who may be subject to deportation as a result of the 
criminal conviction has a right under the Sixth Amendment to be advised of such 
consequences before entering a plea.  
Therefore, the Law Court’s underlying rationale in Ngo II that “deportation is a 
civil rather than a criminal sanction”136 and that “deportation is not imposed as 
punishment,”137 is no longer valid in light of Padilla.  The Law Court will 
inevitably have to reconsider its analysis in Ngo II in order to determine what 
remedy is available for a non-citizen raising an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim while awaiting deportation as a result of a criminal conviction.  Furthermore, 
post-conviction review should be available to non-citizens in these cases because, 
based on the rationale in Padilla, the court could reasonably interpret deportation 
as a “present restraint” under Maine’s post-conviction review statute.  The 
remaining question that must be addressed by the court, however, is how Padilla 
should be applied in Maine, and specifically whether Padilla should be applied 
retroactively to criminal convictions that were issued before Padilla was decided.  
The answer to that question will depend on whether the court interprets Padilla as a 
new constitutional rule under Teague.  Because a number of courts have already 
addressed this question and are split as to the answer, the Supreme Court may 
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ultimately be called upon for the answer.  
Some courts have held that Padilla announced a new constitutional rule under 
Teague and therefore does not apply retroactively.138  For example, the Cumberland 
County Superior Court of Maine, one of the first courts to address the issue only 
months after Padilla in 2010, concluded in State v. Truong139 that Padilla 
announced a new constitutional rule and did not apply retroactively.140  The 
defendant filed a motion to vacate his criminal convictions from 1996 and a motion 
for a new trial under Maine Rules of Criminal Procedure 1 and 2 on the grounds 
that he did not receive effective assistance of counsel because his attorney did not 
advise him of the immigration consequences of his criminal convictions in 1996.141  
The Superior Court denied the defendant’s motion after holding that Padilla did not 
apply retroactively.142  The court explained: 
[T]he Court’s holding in Padilla breaks new ground in terms of the scope of 
representation required for constitutional representation under the Sixth 
Amendment; Prior to its 2010 decision in Padilla, the Supreme Court has never 
held that defense counsel in a criminal case had any particular responsibility to 
advise an alien defendant of the potential consequences of a conviction under the 
immigration laws . . . .143 
Similarly, in United States v. Hong,144 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals also 
held that Padilla announced a new rule because it “was not dictated or compelled 
by Court precedent.”145  In 2010, the defendant was subject to deportation as a 
result of his 2008 criminal conviction.146  He subsequently petitioned for habeas 
corpus seeking to vacate his criminal conviction on the grounds that he did not 
receive effective assistance of counsel because he was not advised of the 
immigration consequences of a criminal conviction before he entered a guilty 
plea.147  The lower court denied his motion and the Tenth Circuit dismissed his 
appeal after concluding that Padilla did not apply retroactively to cases on 
collateral review.148  The court reasoned that, prior to Padilla, many state and 
federal courts did not previously consider the Sixth Amendment right to effective 
assistance of counsel as requiring counsel to advise a client of collateral 
consequences such as immigration consequences.149  Therefore, the court 
concluded that, “the application of Strickland to immigration consequences of a 
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guilty plea, was an extension of Strickland into previously untread grounds.”150 
In contrast, some courts have held that Padilla does apply retroactively 
because it did not announce a new constitutional rule under Teague.  For example, 
in Commonwealth v. Clarke,151 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
concluded that Padilla did not announce a new rule but rather was “an extension of 
the rule in Strickland . . . .”152  The defendant filed a motion for a new trial 
claiming he did not receive effective assistance of counsel because he was not 
advised of the immigration consequences of his criminal conviction prior to 
entering his guilty plea.153  The lower court denied his motion.154  The Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that Padilla applied retroactively but affirmed 
the denial of the defendant’s motion after finding that the defendant failed to satisfy 
the second requirement of prejudice under Strickland.155  In deciding that Padilla 
applied retroactively, however, the court reasoned that since the Supreme Court in 
Strickland did not specifically define all of counsel’s duties or obligations to a 
client,156 the Court intended the Strickland analysis to be a “case-by-case 
application” that would require “some examination of the facts” in each case.157  
The court concluded that, “[Padilla] is the definitive application of an established 
constitutional standard on a case-by-case basis, incorporating evolving professional 
norms (on which the standard relies) to new facts. It is not the creation of a new 
constitutional rule.”158   
Likewise, in United States v. Orocio,159 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals 
held that Padilla applied retroactively because it did not announce a new rule.160  
The court explained that the Supreme Court precedent “require[s] effective 
assistance of counsel on all ‘important decisions’ in plea bargaining that could 
‘affect[] the outcome of the plea process . . . .”‘161  The court reasoned that, 
“Padilla is best read as merely recognizing that a plea agreement’s immigration 
consequences constitute the sort of information an alien defendant needs in making 
‘important decisions’ affecting ‘the outcome of the plea process . . . .’”162   
It is clear that the retroactivity of Padilla is a contested issue among courts and 
the Supreme Court will likely have to decide the issue in the future.  Until then, the 
Law Court will need to decide how to apply Padilla in Maine.  Although the 
Padilla holding created an explicit obligation for defense counsel to advise a client 
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of immigration consequences, it was not a “new obligation”163 representing a new 
constitutional rule under Teague.  The Padilla holding was instead an extension of 
what was already required for effective assistance of counsel under Strickland.  In 
Padilla, the Court implied that its holding was not a new rule but rather consistent 
with professional norms which “generally imposed an obligation on counsel to 
provide advice on the deportation consequences of a client’s [guilty] plea.”164   
Furthermore, in Teague, the Court explained that “a case announces a new rule 
if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s 
conviction became final.”165  Even though the Law Court in Maine has primarily 
decided non-citizen claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on procedural rather 
than substantive issues, the significance of immigration status in the context of a 
criminal conviction is clearly not a new concept in Maine.  For example, the Law 
Court recognized in Aldus v. State, which was decided a decade prior to Padilla, 
that defense counsel’s failure to investigate the defendant’s question about 
immigration consequences amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Consequently, Rule 11 of the Maine Rules of Criminal Procedure was amended 
shortly after the Aldus decision, in 2001, to include subsection (h) entitled 
“Immigration Consequences of the Plea.”  Rule 11(h) requires that before the court 
accepts a defendant’s guilty plea, “the court shall inquire whether the defendant is a 
United States citizen” and if the defendant has not already been advised by counsel, 
“the court shall notify the defendant that there may be immigration consequences 
of the plea . . . .”166  Accordingly, the holding in Padilla which imposes a duty on 
defense counsel to advise a client of immigration consequences is not a new rule in 
Maine when viewed in light of Aldus and Rule 11(h) as it was written before 
Padilla was decided.167  Therefore, the Law Court should apply Padilla 
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retroactively.   
Although the Law Court did not address the application of Padilla in Ali, it is a 
significant issue that will need to be decided.  Without the retroactive application of 
Padilla, Ali has no procedural means to raise an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim because he is precluded from post-conviction review under Ngo II.  Based on 
the Supreme Court’s conclusion in Padilla, that immigration consequences are 
“intimately related” and “enmeshed” with criminal convictions, the Law Court 
should reconsider its decision in Ngo II and find that deportation as a consequence 
of a criminal conviction constitutes a “present restraint” under the post-conviction 
review statute.  Furthermore, by applying Padilla retroactively in Maine, Ali and 
other non-citizens will be able to raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim on 
post-conviction review.   
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The Law Court’s recent decisions such as Ali exemplify the procedural barriers 
preventing non-citizens from raising an ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
while awaiting deportation as a result of a criminal conviction.  The court will 
inevitably be required to reconsider the issue, especially in light of the Supreme 
Court’s conclusion in Padilla that deportation is “intimately related” and 
“enmeshed” with criminal convictions.  Moreover, the Law Court will also need to 
decide whether to apply the Padilla holding, which imposes an obligation on 
defense counsel to advise a client of immigration consequences resulting from a 
criminal conviction, retroactively to criminal convictions that occurred before 
Padilla was decided.  Because the connection between deportation and criminal 
conviction is not a new concept in Maine practice, the Law Court should apply 
Padilla retroactively and non-citizens such as Ali should be allowed to raise an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim through post-conviction review.   
                                                                                                     
adverse immigration consequences, including deportation, as a result of the plea. If no 
such advice has been provided, or if the defendant is unrepresented, the court shall notify 
the defendant that the plea can create a risk of adverse immigration consequences, 
including deportation, and may continue the proceeding in order for counsel to provide 
the required advice, or, in the case of an unrepresented defendant, for investigation and 
consideration of the consequences by the defendant. The court is not required or expected 
to inform the defendant of the nature of any adverse immigration consequences. 
